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Standards for Evaluating Requests for Preliminary
Injunctive Relief in Merger Cases
INTRODUCTION

Section 7 of the Clayton Act' prohibits acquisitions of stock or
mergers which may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce in any section of the country. Effective enforcement of section 7 may be impossible where
consummation of the merger has occurred and restoration of the
merged organizations' separate identities is impractical. A preliminary injunction to prevent the consummation of a merger can serve
to maintain the status quo pending determination of the antitrust
charges at a plenary hearing."
Traditional equitable analysis to determine whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate focuses on the plaintiff's likelihood
of success on the merits, the possibility of irreparable harm, the
equities, and the public interest.' A more liberal test, originating in
the Second Circuit, permits an injunction to issue when the balance of the equities weighs in favor- of the plaintiff and there has
been a "serious and substantial" showing on the merits.4 Which
1.

15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Section 7 provides in pertinent part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
2. The court in Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953)
characterized the nature of a preliminary injunction as follows:
For a preliminary injunction-as indicated by the numerous more or less synonomous adjectives used to label it-is, by its very nature, interlocutory, tentative,
provisional, ad interim, impermanent, mutable, not fixed or final or conclusive,
characterized by its for-the-time-beingness. It serves as an equitable policing measure to prevent the parties from harming one another during the litigation; to
keep the parties, while the suit is on, as far as possible in their respective positions
they occupied when the suit began.
Id. at 742.
The procedure governing temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions is
found in Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.
3. For a general discussion of the preliminary injunction, see D. DOERS, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, OR RESTITUTION

§ 2.10 (1973).

4. This Second Circuit test originated in Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assoc.,
483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973). See notes 20-32 infra and accompanying text for further
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test should be applied to an application for preliminary relief in
an antitrust case touches on basic policy issues at the heart of antitrust law. Preservation of a free and competitive marketplace supports arguments favoring the broad use of preliminary injunctions
to diminish any threat of antitrust violations. Protection of private
interests supports a more conservative approach to insure shareholders their right of access to the marketplace. The type of
merger involved-vertical, horizontal, or conglomerate-is an additional factor to be considered in whether to apply a particular
analysis. Finally, the nature of the plaintiff's interests also may be
critical. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Department of
Justice, and private plaintiffs each are empowered to seek preliminary injunctive relief where an antitrust violation is alleged.5
This note will discuss the tests used by the courts in determining
whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief in antitrust cases.
First, the traditional analysis and the alternative approach of the
Second Circuit will be presented, with particular attention to the
implications of these tests for merger cases. Second, courts have
differentiated their analysis of injunctive relief based on whether
the plaintiff is the FTC, the Justice Department, or a private
party. The underlying rationale for this approach and its disparate
results will be delineated. Finally, a uniform standard of analysis
will be proposed which could be applied to all requests for preliminary injunctive relief where an antitrust violation is alleged.
EVALUATION OF THE NEED FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF:

Two MODELS
Traditional Equitable Analysis
Traditionally, courts have refrained from issuing the drastic
remedy of a preliminary injunction,6 and have limited their use to
cases where the issuance of an injunction is necessary to preserve
the status quo pending resolution of the underlying conflict.7 Pres-

discussion.
5. The Department of Justice may seek preliminary injunctive relief against proposed
antitrust violations through § 15 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976). Private parties
may seek this relief through § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976). The FTC is
empowered to seek preliminary relief through § 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976).
6. 11 C. WiuoHT & A. MILLER, FED=AL PRACTiCE & PRocEDUR § 2948 at 430-31 (1973).
7. II H. TouLmm's ANTRusT LAws § 28.7 (1949). See also FTC v. Food Town Stores,
Inc., 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d
Cir. 1963); Harriman v. Northern Securities Co., 134 F. 331 (3d Cir. 1905); United States v.
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ervation of the status quo in merger cases is especially important,
since maintaining the organizations as separate entities prevents
commingling of assets, employees, and trade secrets. Such commingling can make final relief difficult and ineffective. Yet, the granting of a preliminary injunction often effectively means a final resolution, where the parties abandon the merger rather than face
complex, costly, and time-consuming litigation.' The final effect of
the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction on the merger is an
unarticulated factor often considered by the courts in their
decisions.
Under the traditional equitable test, whether or not a merger
should be enjoined is dependent upon a showing by the plaintiff
that (1) there is a significant threat of irreparable harm to the
plaintiff if the injunction is denied; (2) the irreparable harm to the
plaintiff if the injunction is denied outweighs the injury defendant
would suffer if the injunction were granted; (3) the plaintiff -will
likely succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest weighs in
favor of the injunction.9 Applying these factors more specifically to
the merger context, the threshold showing of irreparable injury can
be satisfied by demonstrating threatened injury to competition. 10
This reflects the general policy of the antitrust laws to preserve
and protect the competitive nature of the economy, and the specific goal of the Clayton Act to halt violations of that policy in
their incipiency." The threatened injury to competition, however,
must be substantial to withstand the equities which may be raised
by the opposing party.
Balancing the equities includes consideration of alternative remedies to the preliminary injunction. Because of the drastic nature
of preliminary injunctive relief, courts often opt instead for the

Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 223 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
8. See text accompanying note 101 infra.
9. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2948 at 430-31 (1973).
10. An injury to competition was demonstrated by proof of increased market concentration in: FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976); FTC v. Lancaster
Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Elco Corp. v. Microdot, Inc., 1973 Trade
Cas. 1 74,655 (D. Del. 1973); Boyertown Burial Casket Co. v. Walco Nat'l Corp., 1972 Trade
Cas. 74,088 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 202 F. Supp. 779 (E.D.
Wis. 1962).
11. The Senate Committee Report on § 7 of the Clayton Act stated the intent of Congress was "to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and well before they
have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding." Hamilton Watch Co.
v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 1953), citing S. R"P. No. 1775, 81st Cong.,
2nd Seas. 4-5 (1950).
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remedies of hold-separate orders or divestiture. 1' Hold-separate orders allow the merger to proceed as planned, yet prohibit commingling of assets, trade secrets, or employees pending resolution of
the antitrust claim. 13 Maintaining the autonomy of each organization ideally preserves the status quo without provoking abandonment of the merger. A divestiture order requires the acquiring
company to sell the acquired company. The availability of divestiture as final relief may persuade some courts to balance the equities in favor of the defendant. It may also be raised to refute the
plaintiff's allegation that merger would cause irreparable injury.
Often, however, divestiture is unwieldly and counterproductive.
Acquired companies may have divulged trade secrets and relinquished their independence by the time the antitrust violation is
found and divestiture ordered. Key management personnel may
have left and customers may have established new allegiances with
a rival company.14 In addition, a purchaser must usually be found
for the divested company, a difficult and costly task.15 The remedy
of divestiture also is not uniformly available to private plaintiffs.1
Courts excluding divestiture as a private remedy should be more
willing to balance the equities in favor of the private plaintiff.
The third requirement of the traditional analysis, of likelihood
of success on the merits, again reflects the seriousness of the injunctive remedy. The plaintiff's showing of success cannot be
merely speculative. Traditionally, antitrust claims require complex
analysis, which may involve determining market share percentages,
the presence of trade restraints, and defining the relevant product
12. See text accompanying notes 94-96 infra.
13. See generally, ANTITRUST ADvisER §§ 3.62 and 3.56 (2d. ed. C. Hills ed. 1978).
14. Many courts compare the attempt to separate commingled assets to the unwieldly
task of "unscrambling eggs." See text accompanying note 27 infra.
15. Schlitz was reported to have lost as much as $21 million as the result of its forced
divestiture of John Labatt, Ltd., General Brewing Corp. and Burgermeister. Yet Brown
Shoe was reported to have made a pre-tax profit of $14 million on the sale of Kinney Shoes.
ANTrrrusT ADvisER § 3.54 (2d ed. C. Hills ed. 1978).
16. See NBO Indus. Treadway Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 278-79 and n.17
(3d Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nor., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
429 U.S. 477 (1977)(divestiture granted as appropriate private remedy). Contra Intl Tel. &
Tel. Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 920-25 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally
Guerrini, 12 Loy. CHi. L.J. 427 (1981); Comment, Private Divestiture: Antitrust's Latest
Problem Child, 41 FORDHAm L. REv. 569 (1973); Note, The Use of Divestiture in Private
Antitrust Suits, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 261 (1974); Note, Availability of Divestiture in
Private Litigation as a Remedy for Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 49 MmI. L.
Rzv. 267 (1964).
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market.1" Producing sufficient proof of a violation at the preliminary hearing is a considerable task. Nevertheless, the plaintiff

must prevail on this question in order to succeed. This heavy burden of proof is somewhat balanced by policy assumptions which
favor the plaintiff in consideration of the final factor of public interest. Recognizing the insidious nature of antitrust violations,
Congress did not compel a full hearing on the merits before preventive relief could issue.1 8 Rather, when the plaintiff has shown a
likelihood of success on the merits, the potential of irreparable injury, and a balance of equities in its favor, public interest clearly
compels the court to protect the competitive nature of the marketplace by enjoining alleged violations of the antitrust laws.' 9
The Sonesta Analysis
Although the majority of courts use the traditional analysis
when evaluating a request for a preliminary injunction, the Second
Circuit adopted an alternative test beginning with its decision in
Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co.20 In Hamilton Watch,
the plaintiff corporation attempted to prevent a takeover by seeking a preliminary injunction restraining defendant from voting its
newly-obtained shares before resolution of the underlying antitrust
claim. The court, citing tenuous authority,2 1 did not require the
17. See generally ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (1975).
18. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 4-5 (1950).
19. The public interest the government has in preventing concentration in any industry
which may damage competition is readily recognized by the courts. See, e.g., FTC v. Food
Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976) (merger of two local retail food stores was
challenged; the court accorded the public interest in preserving competition such importance that it refused to consider any private harm the defendants would suffer if the merger
was enjoined); United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963) (government
challenged merger of a manufacturer of industrial machinery with three manufacturers of
underground coal mining machinery); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp.
1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd sub noma., Bartlett v. United States, 401 U.S. 986 (1971)(injunction granted preventing the merger of Sinclair Oil Co. and Atlantic Richfield Co.); United
States v. Wilson Sporting Goods, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (preliminary injunction granted preventing merger between a sporting goods manufacturer and a gymnastic
equipment manufacturer); United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 223 F. Supp. 849
(N.D. Cal. 1963) (the court found that public interest was so strong it precluded any claim
of irreparable harm; nevertheless, the injunction restraining the merger of two banks was
denied for failure to show a likelihood of success).
20. 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
21. The court relied, in part, on Harriman v. Northern Securities Co., 134 F. 331 (3d Cir.
1905), a Third Circuit case which arguably suggested a new test. In Harriman, the plaintiff
sought an injunction restraining the defendant from disposing of the stock of Northern Pacific Railroad as a dividend, where defendant allegedly held the stock solely in trust for the
plaintiff. Although the plaintiff was unable to show a likelihood of success on the merits, the
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traditional showing of likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm to uphold the injunction. Instead, it required only
that the balance of equities tipped toward the plaintiff, and that
the plaintiff raised "serious and substantial questions going to the
merits.1 2 The court based this major departure from the tradi-

tional test on the legislative intent of section 16 of the Clayton
Act."' The Senate Committee Report on the Act stated that the
intent of the section was "to cope with monopolistic tendencies in
their incipiency. 1' ' The court concluded that judicial interference
with the merger process at an early stage seemed to be the "paramount aim" of the statute.2 5
This test received limited use in the Second Circuit until it was
again utilized two decades later in Sonesta International Hotels
Corp. v. Wellington Associates.26 As in Hamilton Watch, the
plaintiff in Sonesta was seeking a preliminary injunction to delay a
takeover by the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that defendant
had violated securities regulations by failing to disclose material
facts in the tender offer, and sought a preliminary injunction to
enjoin the takeover pending resolution of the allegations. The
plaintiff was unable to show a likelihood of success on the merits.
Yet the Sonesta court only required the presence of serious and
substantial questions on the merits. The court, recognizing the in-

district court allowed that a showing of serious and substantial questions was sufficient to
grant a preliminary injunction, where the defendant has failed to allege any harm that
would be suffered if the injunction was granted. Harriman v. Northern Securities Co., 132 F.
464 (C.C.N.J. 1904).
On appeal, the grant of the injunction was reversed. The Court of Appeals, while allowing
that the test may have been appropriate, reversed on the facts of the case, finding that the
plaintiff could not show a likelihood of success. 134 F.331. Thus, although the court did not
expressly overrule the lower court's method of evaluation, sub silencio it appeared to discard that test in favor of the traditional equitable standard. Nevertheless, the Hamilton
Watch court relied on the Third Circuit's failure to expressly overrule the lower court to
support a new test for the Second Circuit.
22. The court described the test as follows:
To justify a temporary injunction it is not necessary that the plaintiff's right to a
final decision, after a trial, be absolutely certain . . . if the other elements are
present (i.e., the balance of hardships tips decidedly toward plaintiff), it will ordinarily be enough that the plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so
serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation.
Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1953).
23. Id. at 741-42.
24. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2nd Seas. (1950).
25. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 741-42 (2d Cir. 1953).
26. 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973).
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herent difficulty in dissolving a merger after assets, trade secrets,

and employees had been combined, likened the task of divestiture
to that of "unscrambling eggs.""2 This tipped the balance of equities in favor of the plaintiff and the injunction was upheld.

The Sonesta test, embodying a liberalized approach toward analyzing preliminary injunctive relief, continues to be followed in the

Second Circuit,2" and also has been adopted by the Fourth, 9
Sixth,30 and Ninth Circuits. 1 The test is most widely applied in
suits brought by private parties. The frequent inability of private
plaintiffs to achieve effective final relief once merger has occurred,3 ' and the potentially severe and irreparable harm that may
occur if the merger is not enjoined, have persuaded many courts to
use the more flexible Sonesta test in evaluating requests for preliminary injunctions. These factors are absent when the government is the plaintiff. Thus, where the government is the plaintiff,
the traditional test must usually be satisfied.
Analytical Anomaly: Conglomerate Merger
Whether the traditional or Sonesta analysis is used, the most
determinative factor on the outcome of a motion for preliminary
relief is the type of merger being challenged. Preliminary injunctions may be sought to enjoin vertical, horizontal, or conglomerate
mergers. A vertical merger is defined as a merger in which a company acquires a former customer or supplier.33 A horizontal merger
is commonly defined as a merger between direct competitors." A
27. Id. at 250.
28. See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great At. and Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d
687 (2d Cir. 1973); Carrier Corp. v. United Technologies Corp., 1978-2 Trade Cas. 1 62,393
(N.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 1978-2 Trade Cas. 62,405 (2d Cir. 1978).
29. See Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977).
30. See Brandeis Mach. & Supply Co. v. Barber Green Co., 503 F.2d 503 (6th Cir. 1974).
31. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. I.T. & T. Continental Baking Co., 526 F.2d
86 (9th Cir. 1975).
32. There is considerable controversy among the circuits on the question of whether divestiture should be available to the private plaintiff. It is not always allowed. See note 16
supra and accompanying text.
33. 16A J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS § 17.03 (6th ed.
1979). [hereinafter cited as VON KALNOWSIl]. Professor Turner defines the vertical merger
as the acquisition of the stock or assets of a firm that buys the product sold by the acquirer
or sells a product bought by the acquiror. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. Rxv. 1313, 1315 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Turner].
34. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 33, at § 17.01. Professor Turner defines the simple horizontal merger as the acquisition of a firm producing and selling an identical product or close
substitute in the same geographical market. Turner, supra note 33, at 1315.
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conglomerate merger is one in which the merged companies are
neither competitors nor are they potential or actual customers or
suppliers of each other." Requests for preliminary injunctions involving horizontal and vertical mergers are amenable to traditional
or Sonesta analysis. 36 Conglomerate mergers, however, elude injunctions under either analysis.3 7
A conglomerate merger is, very simply, the merger of two organizations whose product or focus of competition does not overlap."
Consequently, there is rarely an anticompetitive effect occasioned
by the merger which is measurable using traditional antitrust analysis. Anticompetitive mergers may be attacked by relying on tradi-

tional analytical tools of market share and relevant product market. Conglomerate mergers, however, do not result in any
immediate anticompetitive effects. Conglomerate mergers, therefore, must be challenged through the non-traditional antitrust theories of reciprocity, ss entrenchment, 0 and potential competition.4 1
35. A conglomerate merger is a merger in which the merged companies are neither competitors nor potential or actual customers or suppliers of each other. VON KALINOWSKI,
supra note 33, at § 17.06. Professor Turner defines the conglomerate merger as any acquisition that is not a simple horizontal or simple vertical merger. Turner, supra note 33, at
1315.
36. Injunctions are frequently granted in cases involving horizontal or vertical mergers.
See, e.g., United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa. 1963), aflfd, 320
F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtis-Wright Corp., 1978-1 Trade Cas.
62,013 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Boyertown Burial Casket Co. v. Amedco, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 811
(E.D. Pa. 1976); Elco Corp. v. Microdot, Inc., 1973-2 Trade Cas. 1 74,655 (D. Del. 1973);
United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651 (D.N.J. 1964).
37. Injunctions are usually denied when sought against conglomerate mergers. See, e.g.,
Missouri-Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
883 (1974)(plaintiff failed to prevail on merits or equities); Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403
F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975)(insufficient potential injury demonstrated by the plaintiff);
United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (hold-separate
order sufficient protection); United States v. Penick and Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518
(D.N.J. 1965)(mere possibility of reciprocity insufficient to sustain a claim on the merits);
United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal. 1963)(divestiture held to be a
complete remedy in a conglomerate case).
38. See note 35 supra.
39. Reciprocity is the use of purchasing power by the acquiring company to secure sales
for the acquired company. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965);
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See generally
16G J. VON KALINOWSIU, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS § 63.06 (6th ed. 1979);
Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HAsv. L. Rav. 873 (1964); Comment, A Reevaluation of Reciprocal Dealings under the Federal Antitrust Laws: Spartan
Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers, 11 Loy. CHI. L.J. 577 (1980).
40. Entrenchment is the use by the acquired firm of the vast resources of the acquiring
firm to entrench itself in the market. It is also referred to as the "deep pocket" theory. See
generally Bauer, Challenging Conglomerate Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act:
Today's Law and Tommorrow's Legislation, 58 B.U.L. Rev. 199 (1978).
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These legal theories have met with only limited success. 4 1 Consequently, most plaintiffs, whether government or private, fail to
show a likelihood of success on the merits when confronting a conglomerate merger.
If the plaintiff succeeds in showing a likelihood of success, the

hurdles of irreparable harm and balancing the equities remain.
The availability of divestiture does not absolutely preclude a showing of irreparable harm in horizontal or vertical merger cases." It
becomes, however, a more formidable obstacle to a showing of irreparable harm in a conglomerate merger-one upon which courts
have consistently based their decisions denying preliminary relief.4' In a horizontal or vertical merger, the potency of divestiture
as a final remedy may be offset by the realization of its vulnerability in situations where trade secrets, assets, customers, and confidences are so easily commingled. 46 In a conglomerate merger, however. those pragmatic considerations are lessened, if not totally
absent.
Private plaintiffs encounter the same frustration as the government in challenging conglomerate mergers. Requests for preliminary injunctions to enjoin consummation of a conglomerate merger
have, with one exception, been denied. 47 One might expect a different result with the Sonesta test, where a showing of a likelihood of
success on the merits is not required. Plaintiffs evaluated under

41. Potential competition is the theory used to attack conglomerates who enter the market by merger rather than enter as an additional competitor. See generally Bauer, note 40
supra; Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in Economics and Law, 46 GEo. L.J. 672 (1958).
See also Von Kalinowski and Starr, Congress and the Conglomerate Merger Phenomenon:
The Introduction of Antitrust Proposals to Address Non-Antitrust Concerns. 17 HAnv. J.
LEGIS. 209 (1980).
42. See generally Bauer, note 40 supra. See also Turner, note 33 supra.
43. See, e.g., Emhart Corp. v. USM Corp., 527 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1975); Copperweld
Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366
F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973); C. Leonardt Improvement Co. v. Southdown, Inc., 313 F.
Supp. 1146 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
44. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
45. The feasibility of divestiture was cited as a factor in the denial of preliminary injunctions in United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal. 1963); United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 1961 Trade Cas. 70,131 (N.D. Cal. 1961); United States v. Von's Grocery, 1960 Trade Cas. 69,698 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
46. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
47. A preliminary injunction was issued in Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consolidated Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969). The court found a probability of an antitrust
violation based on the theories of potential competition and reciprocity. The court noted,
however, that this was not a pure conglomerate situation, but included elements of horizontal and vertical mergers.
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this test, however, have likewise failed to tip the balance of equities in their favor.4 8
EVALUATION OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF BY THE NATURE
OF THE PLAINTIFF: GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE PARTIES

The distinguishing feature in the application of injunction analysis within the merger context, apart from the conglomerate merger
anomaly, is that variation in analysis is premised on the nature of
the party seeking the injunction. Differences are recognized between the two government agencies entrusted with enforcement of

the Clayton Act; the FTC and the Justice Department. A distinction is also made between government plaintiffs and private plaintiffs. These analytical variations are critical to determining
whether injunctive relief will be granted and therefore merit individual discussion to understand the courts' rationale in following
this approach.
Federal Trade Commission
Until recently, the Federal Trade Commission had no power to
bring an action for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the consummation of a merger, even though it was entrusted with the enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act.49 The FTC only could issue a
cease-and-desist order upon finding an antitrust violation.5 0 The
48. See, e.g., Missouri-Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d
687 (2d Cir. 1973); Carrier Corp. v. United Technologies Corp., 1978-2 Trade Cas. 1 62,393
(N.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 1978-2 Trade Cas. 62,405 (2d Cir. 1978).
49. See FTC v. International Paper, 241 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1956), where the court refused
to recognize jurisdiction under the All Writs Act for the purpose of allowing the FTC to
seek preliminary injunctive relief. The court reasoned that Congress had made explicit provisions for the Department of Justice and private parties to enforce the Clayton Act,
through §§ 15 and 16 of the Clayton Act, respectively. Congress' failure to provide a similar
enforcement mechanism for the FTC signified its intent to confine the enforcement mechanism of the FTC to its use of the cease-and-desist order. The court viewed the FTC's suit
under the All Writs Act as an attempt to circumvent Congressional intent, and denied
jurisdiction.
50. The FTC's cease-and-desist power is found in 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1976), which provides in pertinent partWhenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any such person, partnership, or corporation has been or is using any unfair method of competition or
unfair or deceptive act or practice ... [t]he person, partnership, or corporation so
complained of shall have the right to appear at the place and time so fixed and
show cause why an order should not be entered by the Commission requiring such
person, partnership, or corporation to cease and desist from the violation of the
law so charged in said complaint.
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agency's inability to obtain a preliminary injunction to enjoin a
merger pending a finding on the merits, however, frustrated enforcement where the completed merger was insoluble.
Congress was initially unresponsive to the FTC's requests for
legislation empowering the agency to grant preliminary injunctions
on its own initiative.5 1 The Supreme Court, however, recognized
the FTC's need to effectively restrain mergers until the agency
could make a final determination on the alleged antitrust violation.
In FTC v. Dean Foods Co.,5" the Supreme Court allowed the FTC
to bring suit to enjoin a merger under the All Writs Act.aa This
procedural mechanism allowed the FTC, in effect, to obtain a preliminary injunction." This device received only limited use, 55 however, and was replaced by a direct statutory grant of power in 1976,
codified as section 13(b) of the FTC Act. 5 This section authorizes
the agency to seek injunctive relief in the district courts for anti57
trust violations.

51. See Note, Preliminary Injunctionsand the Enforcement of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 40 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 771, 783 (1965), where the author cites an address made by Commissioner MacIntyre to the Conference on Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation, Federal Bar
Association on January 4, 1962.
52. 384 U.S. 597 (1976).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976).
54. The All Writs Act empowers federal courts to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)(1976). The All Writs Act is the source of authority for all orders issued
by a Federal court which preserve its jurisdiction: writs of mandamus, habeus corpus, certiorari, quo warranto, coram nobis, etc. Its unusual use in this context allowed the court to
circumvent the legislature's inaction. Under this rule, a preliminary injunction issues from
the appropriate Court of Appeals, ostensibly to protect the effective exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.
55. Jurisdiction under the All Writs Act was invoked in FTC v. Pepsi Co., Inc., 477 F.2d
24 (2d Cir. 1973)(preliminary injunction denied). See also FTC v. OKC Corp., 1970 Trade
Cas. 73,288 (5th Cir. 1970)(preliminary injunction granted).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976). This was an amendment to the Federal Trade Commission
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 592. The section provides in pertinent part:
Whenever the Commission has reason to believe that any person, partnership or
corporation is violating, or is about to violate any provision of law enforced by the
Federal Trade Commission ... the Commission . . . may bring suit in a district
court of the United States to enjoin any such act or practice. Upon a proper showing that, weighing the equities and considering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be in the public interest, and after notice to the
defendant, a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction may be
granted without bond.
57. Id. It should be noted that the FTC may seek an injunction even before the official
issuance of the FTC complaint. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)(2). This allows the FTC to further the
purpose of the antitrust laws to cope with antitrust violations in their incipiency. See text
accompanying note 24 supra.
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Required Showing on the Merits
The legislative history of section 13(b) suggests that traditional
equitable analysis is inappropriate when considering a request for
injunctive relief brought under this section." Although the FTC
must show a likelihood of success on the merits and a balance of
equities in its favor, the traditional showing of irreparable injury is
not required in order for the FTC to prevail.5" These requisites
have been adopted, in form at least, by a majority of courts which
have considered the issue.6 0 Notwithstanding the elimination of
the irreparable harm requirement, the FTC has not uniformly pre-

vailed under this test."
A major obstacle confronting the FTC has been its inability to
gather sufficient data for preliminary hearings on the injunction to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. The adoption of
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Improvement Acts of 1976 has alleviated
some of the difficulty. e 2 Yet, showing a likelihood of success on
complex antitrust issues remains the most formidable of the elements to be satisfied.2

58. H.R. REP. No. 624, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1973), reprinted in 2 U.S. CODb CONG. &
ADmUN. NEWS 2523, 2533 (1973).
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., FTC v. Nat'l Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979); FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977); FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339 (4th
Cir. 1976); FTC v. British Oxygen Co., 529 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1976); FTC v. Southland, 471
F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1979); FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977).
61. Injunctions were denied for failure to satisfy this test in FTC v. Beatrice Foods Co.,
1978-2 Trade Cas. 62,148 (D.D.C. 1978)(merger of two companies in "ready to serve" orange juice market); FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977) (merger
between producer of petroleum products and producer of copper and uranium products);
FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977)(merger of two companies manufacturing shock absorbers).
Injunctions have been granted to the FTC where courts apply tests differing from the
traditional test. See FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976) (court
disregarded any private injuries alleged when balancing the equities); FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F.Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (court required only a "fair" chance of success
on the merits).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (a) (1976). The regulations became effective on September 7, 1978. 43
Fed. Reg. 1 36,054 (1978). These amendments provide for a complete pre-merger notification
of the government by parties contemplating mergers, and were enacted in response to the
inability of the government to halt anticompetitive mergers due to their lack of information.
For further discussion of the requirements of these amendments, see Note, The Goal of the
New Premerger Notification Requirements: Preliminary Relief Against Anticompetitive
Mergers, 1979 DuKE Urv. L.J. 249.
63. This heavy burden of proving a likelihood of success on the merits at the preliminary
stages of the investigation has prompted the FTC to argue, albeit unsuccessfully, for a les-
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At least one district court has examined the legislative history of

section 13(b) and concluded that the FTC need show "something
less" than a probability of success." It merely required the FTC

to show "a fair and tenable chance of success" on the merits." Although this test appears on its face to be more lenient, it has not
proven to be an easier test for the FTC to satisfy."
The alternative Sonesta test developed in the Second Circuit
has also been applied to FTC actions.6 7 The FTC then must show

only "serious and substantial questions going to the merits" and a
balance of equities in its favor. The nature and complexity of antitrust litigation necessarily involves judicial evaluation of relevant
product markets, lines of competition and anticompetitive effects.
It is rare where serious and substantial questions are not presented
at the preliminary hearing. Consequently, the FTC has uniformly
prevailed on this section of the test."s
Required Showing on the Equities
Assuming the FTC has been able to satisfy the required showing
on the merits, the agency still must balance the public and private
equities in its favor. The public interest in preservation of a competitive market consistently carries great weight in balancing the
equities and often outweighs private interests involved. e9 Characsening of that burden, provided there is a strong showing on the equities. FTC v. Tenneco,
Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977).
64. FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088, 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Suit was
brought to enjoin the merger of a manufacturer of machine pressed glass and a manufacturer of machine blown glass. The court relied on the legislative history of § 13 (b) to support its conclusion that public interest carried the greatest weight in evaluating this request
for an injunction; only a fair and tenable chance of success was required to supplement this
showing. The injunction was granted.
65. Id. at 1090.
66. Injunctions were denied using this test in both FTC v. Beatrice Foods Co., 1978-2
Trade Cas. V 62,148 (D.D.C. 1978), and FTC v. Southland, 471 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1979).
The Southland court found that only a de minimus anticompetitive effect was shown, which
was insufficient to satisfy even the fair and tenable standard. This test has been specifically
rejected in FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977). See also FTC v. British
Oxygen, 529 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1976); FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir.
1976); FTC v. Rhinechem Corp., 459 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. I1. 1976).
67. See, e.g., FTC v. National Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979); FTC v. Rhinechem
Corp., 459 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Ill.
1978).
68. See FTC v. Nat'l Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979) (preliminary injunction denied based on failure to balance equities in favor of the FTC); FTC v. Rhinechem Corp., 459
F. Supp. 785 (N.D. M. 1978)(preliminary injunction granted).
69. See FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976); FTC v.
Rhinechem Corp., 459 F. Supp. 785 (N.D.Ill.
1978); FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F.
Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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terization of the public interest, however, is often determinative of
this result. Where the public interest is characterized as preservation of a competitive economy, private interests must be substantial to outweigh the public interest inherent in any enforcement of
the antitrust laws. 70 Where public interests are more narrowly defined, however, to exclude traditional considerations of anticompetitive effect, the private interests may prevail. In FTC v. Exxon
Corporation,71 for example, the FTC sought to bar the acquisition
by Exxon of a company that manufactured a component critical to
Exxon's energy development program. The court defined the public interest as the production of energy at maximum efficiency and
at a significant savings, and therefore compatible with the private
interest in the merger.7 2 Although most courts feel that the public
interest is best served by preservation of a competitive marketplace, they will not include increased efficiency, economic hardship,"' or delivery
of a product at a lower price as being in the
74
public interest.
The Fourth Circuit proposed an extremely favorable test on the
equities for the FTC in FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc.75 Although
70. See, e.g., FTC v. Nat'l Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979)(public interest was
outweighed by the imminent failure of one of the merging companies).
71. 1979-2 Trade Cas. 1 62,763 (D.D.C. 1979).
72. The court defined the public interest as follows:
The antitrust laws are not, after all, ends in themselves, but only means to the end
of serving the public interest. That public interest would seem to lie in this instance in the development and distribution of improved electrical equipment that
is capable of manufacture and sale at low cost and that-in the midst of the present energy crisis-may be operated with maximum efficiency and with significant
savings in energy.
FTC v. Exxon Corp., 1979-2 Trade Cas. 1 62,763 (D.D.C. 1979).
73. But see FTC v. Nat'l Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979), where the court denied a
preliminary injunction as being in the public interest where the acquired company's potential failure was imminent, and was certain to occur if the merger was enjoined. For further
discussion of the case see 65 CoRm L. Rzy. 438 (1980).
74. The Supreme Court stated this view most forcefully in United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963):
We are clear, however, that a merger the effect of which 'may be substantially to
lessen competition' is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or
economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial. A value choice of such
magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial competence, and in any event
has been made for us already, by Congress when it enacted the amended § 7.
Congress determined to preserve our traditionally competitive economy. It therefore proscribed anticompetitive mergers, the benign and the malignant alike, fully
aware, we must assume, that some price might have to be paid.
Id. at 371.
75. 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976).
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the court adopted the traditional likelihood of success standard in
its evaluation of the merits, it departed from the traditional approach in balancing the public and private equities. Instead of
weighing public equities against private equities, the court concluded that Congress had intended to exclude consideration of any
private equities put forth by defendants.7 Using this approach, the
FTC need only show a potential threat to the public interest. This
requirement could be easily satisfied by the ubiquitous threat of
anticompetitive effect. Courts which have followed this approach
have granted the FTC preliminary injunctions regardless
of the
77
merits.
the
on
meet
to
required
standard the FTC was
It is doubtful Congress intended such an extreme result. Indeed,
Congress entrusted the district courts with the task of evaluating
each request for a preliminary injunction. The courts are accorded
much discretion in their analysis, which is appropriate given the
uniqueness and complexity of each situation. Excluding consideration of private harm predisposes the court towards granting an injunction to such a degree that it, in effect, leaves the court no discretion at all. The legislative history indicates that, more likely,
Congressional intent was to dramatize the public interests involved. This emphasis is appropriate in light of the7 FTC's responsibility to prohibit unfair methods of competition.
Department of Justice
The Department of Justice is empowered to prevent and restrain
violations of section 7 of the Clayton Act.7

enforcement is section 15 of the Clayton

Act,80

The mechanism for

which provides that

76. The court rationalized that many private harms would result from enjoining any
merger, yet Congress' authorization of injunctive relief indicated that little weight should be
given to them. 539 F.2d 1346. Among the private harms alleged which were given no weight
were: possible abandonment of the merger; the possible subjection of the target company to
lawsuits by creditors and shareholders; a loss in personnel due to the uncertainty occasioned
by the suit; and the acquired company's urgent need to arrange substantial new financing on
short notice if the merger was delayed. Id. at 1345.
77. FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976); FTC v. Lancaster
Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); FTC v. Rhinechem Corp., 459 F. Supp.
785 (N.D. M. 1978).
78. See Kelly, Preliminary Injunctions in F.T.C. Merger Cases: A Proposal for Expanded Use of PreliminaryStructuralDecrees, 14 U. S. F. L. Rzv. 1 (1979), for a discussion
of effective preliminary relief.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). The text of § 7 is contained in note 1 supra.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976). The government may seek injunctive relief through this provision concurrent with a private party's request for injunctive relief. United States v. Borden
Co., 347 U.S. 514 (1974). See also 16B J. VoN KALINOwSKi, ANTrrRUsT LAws AND TRADs
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"[p]ending hearing and determination of the case the court may at
any time make such temporary restraining order[s] or prohibition[s] as shall be deemed just." 81 Various tests have been applied
to requests for preliminary injunctive relief. Generally, however,
the government is usually required to show a reasonable
probability of success on the merits. While some courts require
only that limited showing,"' most, in addition, require a showing of

irreparable harm and a balancing of the equities in favor of the
public interest. 88
Required Showing on the Merits

The Justice Department has experienced the same difficulties in
showing a likelihood of success on the merits as has the FTC."
Whereas some courts have relieved the FTC of some of its burden
of proof by only requiring that the substantial questions test be
met, this test has received limited application in cases brought by

11.14 (6th ed. 1979).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976). The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have concurrent power to enforce the antitrust laws. To avoid unnecessary duplication
REGULATIONS §

of effort, the two agencies work closely together. I P.

ARERDA

& D. TuRNER, ANrITusT

LAW

§ 305(c) (1978).
82. See, e.g., United States v. White Consolidated Indus., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D.
Ohio, 1971); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), afl'd
sub nom., Bartlett v. United States, 401 U.S. 986 (1971); United States v. Int'l Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971); United
States v. Northwest Indus., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. M. 1969); United States v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 1966 Trade Cas. 1 71,872 (S.D. Cal. 1966); United States v. Aluminum Ltd.,
1965 Trade Cas. 71,366 (D.N.J. 1965); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651
(D.N.J. 1964).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 575 F.2d 222 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied sub nom., Aqua Media v. United States, 439 U.S. 959 (1980); United
States v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas. 1 61,165 (D. Nev. 1976); United
States v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 345 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Mich. 1972); United States v.
Wachovia Corp., 313 F. Supp. 632 (W.D.N.C. 1970); United States v. Wilson Sporting
Goods, 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. I.1968); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville,
1964 Trade Cas. 71,209 (M.D. Tenn. 1964); United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817
(N.D. Cal. 1963); United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa.), afl'd,
320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963); United States v. Gimbel Bros., 202 F. Supp. 779 (D. Wis. 1962);
United States v. Von's Grocery, 1960 Trade Cas. 1 69,698 (S.D. Cal. 1960); United States v.
Continental Can Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 1 68,479 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
84. See text accompanying notes 60-68 supra. Failure to demonstrate a likelihood of
success on the merits was the reason cited when preliminary injunctions were denied in the
following cases: United States v. Int'l TeL & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969),
appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971); United States v. Northwest Indus., 301 F. Supp.
1066 (N.D. Ill.
1969); United States v. Tidewater Marine Service, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 324
(E.D. La. 1968); United States v. Aluminum Ltd., 1965 Trade Cas. 1 71,366 (D.N.J. 1965);
United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965).
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the Justice Department.8" Likewise, the test of "fair and tenable"
measure of success has never been applied to a Justice Department
action. In contrast to the FTC, the legislative history of section 15
has not been interpreted to permit the application of a non-traditional standard. 86 Consequently, the majority of courts hold the
Justice Department to the traditional equitable standard requiring
87
a showing of likelihood of success on the merits.
Preliminary injunctions sought by the Justice Department are
also frequently denied because of failure to demonstrate irreparable harm." Frequently the underlying reason for this conclusion is
that divestiture is seen as a feasible alternative. 9 Courts recognizing the inherent complexities of the divestiture remedy, however,
have not allowed it to rebut the government's showing of irreparable harm."
Required Showing on the Equities
After showing a probability of success on the merits and the
likelihood of irreparable harm, the government must balance the
equities in its favor. Despite the availability of divestiture, the presumption that the public interest is harmed by even temporary anticompetitive situations remains strong. For example, the district
85. This test was applied in United States v. Parents Magazine, 1962 Trade Cas. 1 70,437
(N.D. IMI.1962).
86. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 575 F.2d 222 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied sub nom., Aqua Media v. United States, 439 U.S. 959 (1980); United
States v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas. 1 61,165 (D. Nev. 1976); United
States v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 345 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Mich. 1972); United States v.
White Consolidated Indus., 323 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Ohio 1971); United States v. Wachovia
Corp., 313 F. Supp. 632 (W.D.N.C. 1970).
88. The Justice Department failed to show irreparable harm in United States v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 345 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Mich. 1972); United States v. Von's Grocery,
1960 Trade Ca.
69,698 (S.D. Cal. 1960); United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817
(N.D. Cal. 1963); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1961 Trade Cas. 1 70,131 (N.D. Cal.
1961).
89. Courts specifically relied on the availability of divestiture or a hold separate order in
denying preliminary injunctive relief in United States v. Culbro Corp., 436 F. Supp. 746
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 345 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Mich.
1972); United States v. Wachovia Corp., 313 F. Supp. 632 (W.D.N.C. 1970); United States v.
Northwest Indus., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. M. 1969); United States v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 1966 Trade Cas. 71,872 (S.D. Cal. 1966); United States v. Aluminum Ltd., 1965 Trade
Cas. 1 71,366 (D.N.J. 1965).
90. United States v. White Consolidated Indus., 323 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Ohio 1971);
United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. IlM.1968); United
States v. Pennzoil, 252 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1965). See divestiture discussion supra, notes
14-15 and accompanying text.
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court in United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co.9 ' considered defendant's potential injuries, yet concluded that "they cannot outweigh the public interest in preventing this merger from taking effect. .

.

. The public interest with which Congress was concerned

in enacting Section 7 is paramount."' 2 The Third Circuit similarly
affirmed a case where the trial court held that "the public interest
in preserving a competitive economy cannot be outweighed by any
private interest. '9 3 Nevertheless, this presumption in favor of the
government may be successfully rebutted.
The public interest, arguably, will be served equally well by either a hold-separate order or an order of divestiture. Predictably,
denials of preliminary injunctions are often accompanied by holdseparate orders, or denied with the knowledge that divestiture will
remain as a form of relief after determination of the antitrust violation." The hold-separate order, however, has been criticized as
being as ineffective as divestiture.95 The availability of a hold-separate order has been accorded varying weight in the balance of equities. It has been held that granting a hold-separate order is "bad
policy", in contravention of the national interest in preventing antitrust violations." Other courts have held the availability of a
hold-separate order to be of significant value when balancing the
equities. 7
Consideration of the availability of a hold-separate order was
carried to its extreme in United States v. InternationalTelegraph
& Telephone Co., 8 where the viability of a hold-separate order
was evaluated as a distinct element of the analysis of the injunction request, rather than as a factor incorporated in the equitable
portion of the traditional test. The court reasoned that the availa91. 297 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), afl'd sub nom., Bartlett v. United States, 401
U.S. 986 (1971).
92. Id. at 1074.
93. United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530, 534 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 320 F.2d
509 (3d Cir. 1963).
94. Denials of preliminary injunctions were accompanied by hold-separate orders in:
United States v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 345 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Mich. 1972); United
States v. Wachovia Corp., 313 F. Supp. 632 (W.D.N.C. 1970); United States v. Northwest
Indus., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. IM. 1969); United States v. Phillips Petroleum, 1966 Trade
Cas. I171,872 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
95. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTritUsT 670-71 (1977).
96. See United States v. Northwest Indus., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969)(preliminary injunction denied; hold-separate order entered); United States v. Gen. Tel. & Elec.

Corp., 156 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) A-5 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
97.
98.

United States v. White Consolidated Indus., 323 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971).
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bility of a hold-separate order would presumably serve the public
interest by preserving the status quo pending decision of the case
on the merits. Yet, such an order would not be so drastic a remedy
as to precipitate abandonment of merger plans.99 While most
courts consider the availability of a hold-separate order when balancing the equities, few have followed this court by according it
status as a less restrictive alternative to the preliminary
injunction. 10 0
Another consideration which may rebut the government's showing on the equities is economic hardship of the defendant. Enjoining any merger inevitably results in some economic misfortune,
if only the expense of litigating the alleged violation. Where an injunction would likely cause the defendant's financial failure, however, courts have occasionally found the balance of equities to
weigh in favor of the defendant, and have allowed the merger to
proceed.1 0 ' Threatened abandonment of a merger is also given considerable weight in balancing the equities where the government is
seeking relief.' 0 '
In sum, the Department of Justice must meet a more stringent
standard in seeking preliminary relief than that required of the
Federal Trade Commission. The unique legislative history of section 13(b) of the FTC Act, which has enabled the FTC to circumvent the traditional equitable test, is inapplicable to suits brought
by the Department of Justice under section 15 of the Clayton
Act. 10 Unlike the FTC, the Justice Department is not relieved of
the necessity of showing irreparable harm;'" nor does it enjoy the
more flexible standards for showing success on the merits accorded

99. Id. at 798.
100. The test was followed, however, in United States v. Wachovia, 313 F. Supp. 632
(W.D.N.C. 1970)(proposed acquisition by a bank of a finance company). See also United
States v. Culbro Corp., 436 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)(proposed merger of cigar manufacturers). Injunctions were denied in both cases.
101. Economic hardship, however, was not sufficient to balance the equities in defendant's favor in United States v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 575 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied sub nom., Aqua Media v. United States, 439 U.S. 959 (1980), where the injunction was issued to preserve the possibility of rescission despite the fact that over two million
dollars of the purchase price had been distributed to the shareholders.
102. The issuance of preliminary injunctions led to the abandonment of mergers in the
following cases: United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., 1964 Trade Cas. 71,311 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651 (D.N.J. 1964); United States v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa. 1963), afl'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
103. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
104. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
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to the FTC.10 5 Where private equities have been ignored in FTC
cases, the same courts have failed to apply this approach to cases

filed by the Justice Department.'" These different standards of
analysis seem incongruous. Varying standards for two government

agencies entrusted with enforcement of the same antitrust laws
serves no apparent policy. A quirk of legislative history should not
be allowed to undermine the government's interest in preserving a
competitive economy through uniform enforcement of the antitrust

laws.
Private Enforcement

Effective antitrust enforcement commands considerable time
and resources. Private antitrust enforcement supplies a supplement to government efforts. Private parties are authorized by section 16 of the Clayton Act to seek injunctive relief "against
threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws. .. ".,11This relief is to be grinted in accordance with traditional equitable principles. Consequently, an injunction should is-

sue only where the danger of irreparable loss or injury is immediate.1 Furthermore, private parties are required to establish a
unique private injury; assertion of a threatened public harm is an
insufficient basis for injunctive relief.1 e Anticompetitive effects

that will not directly harm a private plaintiff are beyond the reach
of a private action for injunctive relief.
Courts originally welcomed private party participation in antitrust enforcement, encouraging private plaintiffs to assume the
role of a "private attorney general."1 10 Currently, however, suits by
private plaintiffs are met with increasing skepticism about the ac105.
106.
107.

See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
See text accompanying notes 75-77 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).

108. Id.
109. Il P. AaEA & D. TuRa,
ANrrmusr LAw § 329 (1978).
110. See Gulf & Western Indus. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.
1973), where the court recognized that
Since it is impossible as a practical matter for the government to seek out and
prosecute every important violation of laws designed to protect the public in the
aggregate, private actions brought by members of the public in their capacities as
investors or competitors, which incidentally benefit the general public interest,
perform a vital public service.
Id. at 699. See also Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consolidated Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d
506, 510 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc. 348 F. Supp. 606, 617 (C.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd in part, 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
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tual motivations of such parties. 1 The private plaintiff may be a
competitor fearing a merger between two rivals, or it may be a supplier of raw materials fearing a vertical merger that would terminate its usefulness. Increasingly, the private plaintiff may be the
target of an unfriendly takeover, seeking to prevent, or at least to
delay, the takeover through any means possible. Courts fear spurious "strike suits" brought by takeover targets designed solely to
raise the spectre of costly, time-consuming litigation to discourage
the prospective acquirer. Costly delay is assured if a preliminary
injunction is granted, and therefore frequently results in abandonment of the merger. 2 Although the purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the status quo pending full deliberation of the merits of the claim, courts increasingly are reluctant to
grant an injunction, the effect of which is often the same as an
affirmative finding of an antitrust violation.
Required Showing on the Merits
The traditional and most widely used test for evaluation of a
private party request for an injunction requires the plaintiff to
show a likelihood of success on the merits and a danger of immediate irreparable harm.118 In cases utilizing the traditional standard
of review, the determination of a likelihood of success on the merits is a critical factor.'1 4 The plaintiff's ability to prevail on this
element depends primarily upon the unique circumstances of the
case and its ability to document an antitrust violation." 8
The alternate Sonesta test, requiring a showing of serious and
substantial questions going to the merits and a balancing of the
equities in favor of the plaintiff, has received its widest application
111. See generally, Note, Target Company Defensive Tactics Under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 4 CONN. L. REv. 352 (1971).
112. The threat of abandonment of the merger was given great weight in Missouri-Portland Cement Co., v. Cargill, 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883; See also
Crane Fruehauf, Ltd. v. Fruehauf Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 1 72,885 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Both
courts denied the requests for preliminary relief.
113. See Harnischfeger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc, 624 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1979)(unpublished

opinion; discussion of opinion may be found at 946

ANTrrrUsT

&

TRADE REGULATION

Ri-

(BNA) A-15 (Jan. 10, 1980)); Elco Corp. v. Microdot, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741 (D. Del.
1973); Boyertown Burial Casket Co. v. Walco Nat'l Corp., 344 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Amer. Smelting & Refining Co. v. Pennzoil United, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 149 (D. Del. 1969);
Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177 (E.D. Mich. 1960), affd, 280 F.2d 747 (6th
Cir. 1960).
114. See notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text.
115. For a general discussion of the difficulties plaintiffs may face in proving an antitrust
violation, see ANTITRUsT ADVISER §§ 3.21-3.36 (2d ed. C. Hills ed. 1978).
PORTER
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Private plaintiffs in jurisdic-

tions using this test have usually succeeded in showing serious and
substantial questions going to the merits. 171 The Second Circuit,
which originated this test, has suggested, however, a stricter standard of proof for private parties attempting to block a takeover
attempt with a preliminary injunction. In Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill,Inc."1 8 the court characterized plaintifs use of
the preliminary injunction as "[d]rawing Excalibur from a scab-

bard where it would doubtless have remained sheathed in the face
of a friendly offer.""' Comparing the use of this form of equitable
relief to a private weapon, the court concluded that the intention
of the framers of section 16 was not to allow "incumbent management of a target company. . . power to block free trade in its securities unless the anti-trust violation was fairly clear or the potential damage to the corporation decisively outweighed that to the
would-be acquirer.' 2 This caveat to the Sonesta test, then, requires a convincing showing of an antitrust violation. The Second
Circuit's decision seemed to emphasize the conglomerate nature of
the merger when denying the injunction. 2 ' It is not clear, however,
that the court intended the takeover target test to be limited to

116. See, e.g., Carrier Corp. v. United Technologies Corp., 1978-2 Trade Cas. 62,393
(N.D.N.Y. 1978); Crane Freuhauf Ltd. v. Freuhauf Corp., 1977-2 Trade Cas 1 61,708
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D.Pa. 1975); Anaconda
Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
117. Id.
118. 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
119. Id. at 854. The court continues:
The target company typically hopes to obtain a temporary injunction which may
frustrate the acquisitions since the offering company may well decline the expensive gambit of a trial, or, if it persists, the long lapse of time could so change
conditions that the offer will fail even if, after a full trial and appeal, it should be
determined that no antitrust violation has been shown.
Id.
120. Id. at 870. (emphasis added).
121. The opinion proposed
Where, as here, the acquisition would be neither horizontal nor vertical, there are
'strong reasons for not making the prohibitions of section 7 so extensive as to
damage seriously the market for capital assets, or so broad as to interfere materially with mergers that are procompetitive in their facilitation of entry and expan•sion that would otherwise be subject to serious handicaps.' [quoting from Turner,
supra, note 5 at 13181.
Id. at 854. The FTC subsequently filed a complaint challenging this acquisition, and Cargill
withdrew its offer. 1 ABA ANTrrausT SECTION, MERGERS AND THE PRIVATE ANTITusT Surr:
THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION

7

OF THE CLAYTON AcT-PoLICY AND LAW

(1977), [hereinafter cited as ABA Monograph].

38, n.145
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conglomerate mergers. 122 To the contrary, that test subsequently
has been applied to deny preliminary injunctions in cases involving
a horizontal merger, 12 3 a merger with both horizontal and vertical
effects, 2 4" and a merger with horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate
elements.12 5 It is significant that this stricter standard for takeover
targets developed in the Second Circuit, the source of the arguably
'
more lenient standard of "serious and substantial questions. z21
Another factor which may influence the court's finding on the
plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits is the effect of government action, or inaction. The Justice Department has merger
guidelines which generally indicate when the department will challenge a planned merger. 27 The Justice Department also issues business letters, stating its intention not to challenge a merger. 2 8 Although the FTC has not developed comprehensive guidelines, it
has investigated industries in certain markets and has indicated its
policies for each industry. 2 9 Although some courts discount any
government proclamations, others perceive the government's
guidelines as indicative of the plaintiff's ability to demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits. 30

122. The court initiated its discussion by emphasizing the importance of identifying
what harm exists where there is neither a vertical nor horizontal acquisition. 498 F.2d at
854. Yet, the court's conclusion emphasized the threatened abandonment of the merger and
the target company's private motives, without referring to the nature of the merger. 498
F.2d at 870.
123. ICM Realty v. Cabot, Cabot & Forbes Land Trust, 378 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
124. Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
125. Carrier Corp. v. United Technologies Corp., 1978-2 Trade Cas. 1 62,393 (N.D.N.Y.),
af'd, 1978-2 Trade Cas. 62,405 (2d Cir. 1978).
126. The Second Circuit cited the Sonesta test, but found that Missouri-Portlandplaintiffs were unable to show a clear violation of antitrust law sufficient to satisfy the traditional
test; nor were they able to balance the equities in their favor under the Sonesta test. Missouri-Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 867 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
883 (1974).
127. 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 4510 (1968).
128. ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 121, at 26-28.
,129.
Id.
130. The courts in Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consolidated Industries, 414 F.2d
506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970), and American Smelting & Refining
Co. v. Pennzoil United, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 149 (D. Del. 1969), both utilized the Justice Department Merger Guidelines in finding a sufficient showing of a probable antitrust violation.
But see Int'l Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Co., 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Hawaii, 1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975), holding that a business letter from the
Department of Justice was not binding on the court; it was the obligation of the court to
determine independently if an antitrust violation existed.
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Required Showing of IrreparableHarm
Traditionally, in addition to a showing on the merits, private
plaintiffs must also show irreparable harm. 13 1 Although irreparable
harm is not an express component of the Sonesta test, a showing
of irreparable harm is considered implicit in balancing the equities."3 2 Where the private plaintiff is not the target of a takeover,
general anticompetitive effects, such as loss of market share, may
comprise irreparable harm. Takeover targets, however, will not suffer competitively as the result of their takeover. Therefore, elements of irreparable harm must be found elsewhere.
Takeover targets have successfully asserted irreparable harm by
showing the adverse effects of the proposed takeover on employee
recruitment, company morale, individual performance, and customer relationships.3 3 One court found irreparable harm upon evidence that the takeover target's ability to obtain equity and debt
financing would be impaired; the value of the stock of the target
would be depressed; the company would have difficulty retaining
management; the labor force would be demoralized; and stockholders therefore would tender their stock to the detriment of the status quo and the public interest.1 " Conversely, the plaintiff deprecated irreparable harm to the acquiring company as the mere loss
of a business opportuntiy to acquire control of a competitor.3 3 Another court used an equally broad approach to find irreparable
harm in the use of executive time spent resisting the target offer;
the adverse effect upon salesmen's performance in the field; the
lack of customer confidence; the acquiring company's access to
confidential business records; and the adverse effect on employee
morale.1 86 Companies also have asserted as irreparable harm the
loss of other, possibly more profitable, opportunities to sell the
company; the difficulty management may experience in selling the
131. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
132. Triebewassar & Katz v. A. T. & T. Co., 535 F.2d 1356 (2d Cir. 1976).
133. See, e.g., Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great AUt. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.
1973)(recognizing the adverse effect of takeover threat on executive morale as irreparable
harm). But see Missouri-Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974) (the court criticized inclusion of executive morale as a subject
for irreparable harm); Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D.Pa. 1975)(where
the court rejected the intervenor-AFL-CIO's argument that a merger resulting in a Parisbased corporation would strain labor relationships, thereby causing irreparable harm).
134. 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,793 (D. Md. 1976).
135. Id. at 73-264.
136. Boyertown Burial Casket Co. v. Amedco, Inc., 1976-1 Trade Cas. 60,792 (E.D. Pa.
1976).
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company after being subject to intensive scrutiny by the court; and
the unwillingness of management, pending resolution of the takeover attempt, to make long-term capital investments necessary to
realize maximum earnings. 18 7 A countervailing factor to the target
company's showing of irreparable harm, however, is the shareholder's right to sell his property in the marketplace in response to
a tender offer. This factor may even be considered the paramount
interest requiring protection by the court.'" This rationale is vulnerable, however, to plaintiff's argument that the shareholder only
holds that right if the acquisition is lawful, and therefore it cannot

be a factor used to determine that legality.189
Finally, it should be noted that the ultimate remedies available
to private parties differ significantly from those available to the
government.4 0 Courts are split on the availability of divestiture as
a private remedy.""1 The government may also seek relief in the
form of spin-off of the acquired corporation, establishment of a
new company, banning of further acquisitions by the takeover
company, or compulsory assistance to the purchaser of divested
property, including use of patents, trademarks, and tradenames.14'
The unavailability of divestiture and related remedies should
weigh in favor of private plaintiffs. If preliminary injunctive relief
is denied, and an antitrust violation is subsequently found, the private party may not be able to obtain effective relief. Courts, however, have found the availability of hold-separate orders to be an
adequate substitute for the remedy of divestiture.4 8
137.

ANTITRUST ADVISES § 3.54 (2d ed. C. Hills ed. 1978).
138. Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
139. That argument balanced the equities against the shareholder in Gulf & W. Indus.,
Inc. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973), where the court found the
"probability that the investment is unlawful . . . is sufficiently strong to call into serious

question G & W's right to proceed with the tender offer." Id. at 698. Chemetron Corp. v.
Crane Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas 61,717 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Elco Corp. v. Microdot, Inc., 360 F.
Supp. 741 (D. Del 1973).
140. See generally Arnrrisr Anvs
§§ 3.61-3.65 (2d ed. C. HiLLs ed. 1979).
141. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
142. Id. While rescission of a merger agreement has not yet been granted in a private
suit, it has been ordered in a government suit. United States v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of
L.A., 575 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom., Aqua Media v. United States, 439
U.S. 959 (1980). See generally Note, Section 7 Clayton Act Remedies-The Rescission Decision, 64 CoIRjmLL L. REv. 736 (1979).
143. See, e.g., Carrier Corp. v. United Technologies, 1978-2 Trade Cas. 1 62,393
(N.D.N.Y.), affd, 1978-2 Trade Cas. 1 62,405 (2d Cir. 1978); ICM Realty v. Cabot, Cabot &
Forbes Land Trust, 378 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co.,
411 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), where a hold-separate order was not issued, since the
acquiror set up a separate subsidiary solely for the purpose of absorbing the acquired com-
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PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFORM TEST

The analysis used to evaluate requests to preliminarily enjoin
mergers varies with the nature of the plaintiff. The Federal Trade
Commission usually is required to show a likelihood of success on
the merits, and a balance of equities in its favor. "4 The Department of Justice normally must show a likelihood of success on the
merits, a balance of equities in its favor, and potential irreparable
harm.14 5 Private parties most often are evaluated according to
traditional equitable standards."' Courts which have adopted the
Sonesta test, on the other hand, require only a balancing of the
equities in the plaintiff's favor and a showing
of serious and sub47
stantial questions going to the merits.1

This variation in standards of analysis has yielded anamolous results in antitrust litigation. The FTC and the Justice Department
are both entrusted with preservation of a free marketplace. Yet,
the two agencies are subject to different standards. of proof when
they attempt to enforce the antitrust laws by requesting a preliminary injunction. The FTC may be able to obtain a preliminary injunction where the Justice Department, under the same facts, will
fail. Furthermore, whether the plaintiff is a government or private
party, each has difficulty producing sufficient data at a preliminary
hearing to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. Material submitted under the pre-merger notification program does provide considerable assistance to the government in making its showing."" The private plaintiff, however, does not benefit from this
pany, and retained all of the acquired company's management personnel pending the outcome of the suit; the court found this sufficient to refute plaintiff's allegations of irreparable
harm.
144. See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
145. See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra.
146. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
147. See text accompanying notes 26-32 supra.
148. The FTC and Justice Department recently reported positive results after the first
year of pre-merger notification. 945 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-21 (Jan. 30,

1980). They suggested that companies have become more cautious of the Clayton Act. During the first 11 months of the program, 814 transactions were filed. Of these, the government
sought more information in 95 cases, resulting in the FTC's attempt to enjoin three mergers,
and the Justice Department's attempt to enjoin six. A "number of transactions" were abandoned after receiving official interest. Their report concludes that:
[T]he Act provides significant benefits to competition by improving the ability of
agencies to discover, investigate and challenge anticompetitive transactions but it
is not a panacea. Its utility should not be judged solely by reference to the number
of injunctions successfully obtained by the enforcement agencies under its
provisions.
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program, and nevertheless is often held to the same showing on the
merits.
Adoption of the Sonesta test for all actions brought to enjoin
mergers would be a reasonable and progressive solution to this
needless array of legal standards. " " This would eliminate the irrational disparity between the burden of proof required of the Justice Department and that required of the FTC. The flexibility of
the Sonesta test would allow the courts to balance the equities
where the plaintiff, whether the FTC, the Justice Department, or a
private party can demonstrate serious and substantial questions on
the merits. A plaintiff who might otherwise be denied injunctive
relief due to failure to show a likelihood of success on the merits,
might still prevail where this deficiency on the merits could be offset by a strong showing on the equities.
Where the government can meet the burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits, the traditional test may be an effective analytical tool. The current pre-notification program considerably assists the government with this task.'50 Notwithstanding this
program however, the government still may be unable to meet the
traditional standard. The flexibility of the Sonesta test would allow
such a deficiency on the merits to be offset by a showing of strong
public interest in preserving competition. This test, however,
would not automatically balance the analysis in the government's
favor. The defendant in a government suit would prevail where the
equities tip in its favor.
The analysis of private party suits similarly would be enhanced
by uniform application of the Sonesta test. Where the private
plaintiff could not show a likelihood of success on the merits, the
Sonesta test would offer a logical alternative. The private equities
of the plaintiff and defendant could be carefully weighed by the
court, thus according equal protection to the interests of both par-

Id. at A-21.
149. This solution was proposed in Report to the President and the Attorney General of
the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws & Procedures, January 22, 1979.
In their "Recommendations for Improvement of Structural and Preliminary Relief"', it was
urged that
Preliminary relief, the most effective and efficient remedy for anticompetitive
mergers, should be made easier to obtain in. . . cases [where a violation of antitrust laws involving market power has been shown]. Preliminary injunctions
should be granted wherever serious, substantial and difficult antitrust issues have
been raised and the balance of equities favors the plaintiff.
Id. at 114.
150. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
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ties. The Sonesta test also appropriately considers whether the
private party is a takeover target. Contrary to traditional antitrust
enforcement the private takeover plaintiff is seeking to protect
purely private interests. Confining the balance of equities solely to
examining private equities prevents a private plaintiff from wielding the "national interest" as a weapon in its litigation arsenal. 15 1
In this way, Sonesta properly focuses the court's analysis. Sonesta
therefore presents the dual advantage of allowing maximum protection in face of an alleged antitrust violation by virtue of the
flexibility of the test, while not limiting the discretion of the court
to consider the motivation and interests of the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION

The unique nature and complexity of antitrust litigation demands a unique test to properly evaluate requests for preliminary
injunctions to restrain possible antitrust violations. That test is the
Sonesta test. It offers a flexible analysis to complement, or better
yet-replace, traditional equitable analysis. Antitrust laws express a
fundamental national policy of preserving competition in the marketplace. This policy demands optimum protection. Adoption of
the Sonesta test would give courts the greatest ability to protect
competition in the marketplace.
PATRICIA NEEDHAM MARUCCI

151.

See note 118 supra and accompanying text.

